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We develop a model of sorting and matching between borrowers and lenders across formal and informal
credit markets in a developing country context. We highlight the role of risk both on credit access and
sectoral choice. We examine how activity and sectoral choice vary across agents with heterogeneous wealth
endowments.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In developing countries, informal and formal segments of credit markets coexist.1 Despite the evolution of
the role attributed to the informal sector from the exploitative moneylender to a potentially key agent for
rural development (Von Pishke et al. 1983), the informal sector is still seen primarily as attending to the
credit needs of borrowers shut out of the formal sector for lack of collateral assets.2 Because they have
ongoing economic and social relationships with community members, informal lenders have an informational
advantage over more centralized formal banks. This advantage, which we can think of as more cost eﬃcient
technologies for screening, monitoring and enforcement, makes it possible for informal lenders to rely less
on collateral to overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems implicit in credit transactions.
While they may be able to make loans available to the asset poor when banks cannot, the cost may be high
as informal lenders typically have high opportunity cost of liquidity and resources spent on screening and
monitoring may be non-trivial. The large interest rate diﬀerentials that have been documented between the
formal and informal sectors lend support to the view of the informal sector as recipient of the “spillover”
demand from the formal sector: only borrowers shut out of the formal sector freely choose a more expensive
informal loan (Barham et al., 1996; Conning 1996; Bell et. al. 1998).
There are important exceptions to this view. Naranong (1995), Chung (1993) and Kochar (1997),
for example call for caution in the estimation of costs of loans and claim that, once transaction costs are
accounted for, the informal sector may be able to oﬀer loans that are actually cheaper than formal ones.
Consequently some borrowers may prefer to borrow from the informal sector, even though they have access
to a formal loan. Those analyses are important because they suggest that understanding the demand side of
the market is crucial and that an informal borrower should not be automatically assumed to have no access
to a formal loan.
In this paper we oﬀer an alternative explanation of why some borrowers may ﬁnd an informal loan
more attractive than a formal one, even though informal loans are more expensive. In particular we relax
1Much of the empirical evidence on formal-informal credit market interactions is focused on Asia. See, for example, Bell et
al. (1997) and Kochar (1997) for India; Townsend (1995) for Thailand; and Floro and Yotopolous (1991) for the Phillipines.
Recent studies in Latin America include Conning (1999) for Chile, Barham et al. (1996) for Guatemala and Trivelli (1998) for
Peru.
2See Barham et al. (1996), Conning (1998) and Zeller (1994) for empirical evidence of wealth biased quantity rationing in
the formal loan sector of developing countries.
1the assumption - implicit in all the mentioned studies - that the choice across sector is based only on the
monetary price of loan. We argue that the relevant cost diﬀerential across sectors is not in terms of expected
income but instead expected utility. By limiting the analysis to the existence of a contract and a choice
based only on expected return, the literature has left out a crucial dimension: the riskiness of the contract.
Indeed under moral hazard the provision of the “right incentives” requires the agent to bear down-side risk
by posting collateral for example. This gives rise to the classic trade-oﬀ between incentive provision and
eﬃcient risk-sharing. When a risk averse agent maximizes his expected utility, both the expected return and
the distribution of the returns across states of nature (in other words, the degree of riskiness of the contract)
are important. Boucher and Carter (2001) show - in a single loan sector - that a risk averse borrower who has
access to an expected income enhancing contract may reject the contract and instead retreat to a certain, low
return activity. This individual is qualiﬁed as “risk rationed.” Since most models of sectoral choice in credit
markets are cast with risk neutral borrowers, they rule out any potential impacts of the incentive/risk-sharing
trade-oﬀ on credit demand. However risk neutrality is not a reasonable assumption when dealing with poor
farmers in rural areas of developing countries where insurance markets are underdeveloped. Accounting for
risk aversion of borrowers adds an important dimension to the analysis of sectoral choice since the ability to
overcome information asymmetries - and thus the degree of risk sharing in available contracts - may diﬀer
across sectors.
Understanding the relationship between the formal and informal sectors of the credit market is partic-
ularly relevant in the current policy context of liberalization of rural ﬁnancial markets in Latin America.
Expectations were high that these reforms would enhance both welfare and equity. Today however, rural
poverty rates remain high and inequality in much of Latin America is rising (Londoño and Székely, 2001).
This raises questions about the structure and functioning of the post-liberalization rural credit markets that
have emerged in the region. Indeed one objective of these policies was - via credit and land market liber-
alization - to increase the poor’s access to formal credit. The prevalence of risk rationing would suggest,
however, that an increased ability to post cdollateral (via land titling programs) mahy not translate into
an increase in the poor’s willingness to participate in formal credit markets. These farmers may prefer
to continue ﬁnancing production with expensive but lower risk informal loans. In that case improvements
2in insurance mechanisms may better serve the goal of raising eﬃciency and equity than policies aimed at
increasing credit access via ‘collateralization’ of wealth.
The paper is structured as follow. In Section 2 we describe a model in which competitive, risk neutral
lenders in both sectors face asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard over the risk averse borrower’s
eﬀort level. Informal lenders have a higher opportunity cost of capital, however they are able to monitor
borrower eﬀo r tl e v e l sa tal o w e rc o s tt h a nf o r m a ll e n d e r s . We show that the informal sector may both oﬀer
loans to borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector and be preferred by some borrowers who do have
access to a cheaper formal loan. In Section 3 section we examine how the sorting and matching of borrowers
and lenders depends on the wealth level of the borrower. While the impact of wealth on quantity rationing
is straightforward, its impact on risk rationing and sectoral choice is more ambiguous as oﬀsetting eﬀects are
at play. We develop intuitions regarding these eﬀects and discuss the dependence of the results on borrower
preferences. Finally we give some directions for future work.
2 Assumptions and Model Structure
2.1 Endowment, Technology and Preferences
In this section, we outline the key assumptions about preferences, technology and information and then
describe the potential choices that agents may face. The model contains three types of actors: farmers,
formal lenders, and informal lenders. Farmers are endowed with ﬁnancial wealth, W ∈ [W,W], which will
be the sole source of heterogeneity. They are also endowed with two mutually exclusive income generating
activities. The farmer’s fallback, or reservation, activity is to work as a wage laborer and earn a certain
wage equal to w. Alternatively, the farmer can undertake risky own-farm production which requires a ﬁxed
investment, K>W . To capture uncertainty, we assume that gross farm revenues are Xg if the state of
nature is “good” and Xb if the state of nature is “bad,” with and Xg >K>X b. Note that farmers’
own wealth is less than the ﬁxed capital requirement so that undertaking the risky project requires outside
ﬁnance.
The agent potentially has three choices. The ﬁrst is whether to undertake risky production or the certain
3wage activity. If she chooses to farm, she faces two additional choices. First, if contracts are available, she
must choose her source of ﬁnancing between the formal versus informal credit sectors. Second, she must
choose the level of eﬀort, e, she applies to farming. The eﬀort level - which we assume can be either high or
low - aﬀects welfare and choice in two ways. First, high eﬀort increases the probability of the good state of
nature and thus raises the expected project return. Letting pH and pL denote respectively the probability




denote expected gross revenues under high and low eﬀort. To make the moral hazard story meaningful, we
assume that expected farm returns under high eﬀort are greater than the certain wage while under low eﬀort
expected farm returns are negative:
X
H
− K>w>0 > X
L
− K (A1)
While high eﬀort increases expected farm returns, it also causes disutility. To capture this, we assume the
following additively separable utility function:
U(I,e,c)=u(I) − d(c;e) (1)
The ﬁrst term is the utility of income which we assume is increasing and concave. Income, I,i nt u r n
is composed of initial wealth plus the net income from the chosen activity - i.e., either the wage or the
payoﬀ from a credit contract. The second term is the disutility of eﬀort which depends both upon the
eﬀort level chosen by the farmer and c, the resources devoted to monitoring by the lender in the case of farm
production or the employer under the wage activity. By monitoring, the lender (or employer) can increase the
farmer’s disutility, for example by imposing social sanctions or negatively inﬂuencing the farmer’s economic
relationships in the community. As such, monitoring is only eﬀective if the agent is exerting low eﬀort. We
also assume that, under low eﬀort, the farmer’s disutility is increasing at a decreasing rate in the amount of
4monitoring These assumptions are summarized by:
d(c;H)=d ∀c>0 (A2)





∂c2 < 0 ∀c>0 (A4)
By raising disutility under low eﬀort, monitoring reduces the farmer’s incentive to shirk. Consider the
following deﬁnition:
B(c) ≡ d − d(c;L). (2)
B is the farmer’s private beneﬁt of taking low instead of high eﬀort. Given assumptions 2, 2, and 2 the
monitoring technology is decreasing and convex in the lender’s monitoring expenditures.
F i n a l l y ,w ea s s u m et h a ti nal o a nc o n t r a c te ﬀort is private information and is non-contractible. If instead
the farmer chooses the wage activity, she will always exert high eﬀort. This assumption - which would be
consistent with a piece-rate task or a job where the worker’s eﬀort is easily inferred by her output - is made
so that we can focus our comparison of activities on the utility of income component of preferences.
The third choice the farmer makes is, again conditional on farming, the loan sector from which she will
seek ﬁnancing. The formal loan sector - corresponding to commercial banks - is characterized by centralized,
regulated institutions with relatively little local information. Speciﬁcally, formal lenders will be unable to
monitor borrowers in a cost-eﬀective manner. The informal sector, corresponding to local economic actors
such as agro-processing ﬁrms, input supply stores, and local merchants - have greater information and are
able to monitor borrowers. As we will develop more concretely below, the ability to monitor will provide a
means of reducing the incentive problem facing the informal lender and may make available contracts with
lower collateral requirements. In addition to easing quantity rationing, the reduction in collateral allows
more eﬃcient risk sharing between borrower and lender and thus may induce some farmers to prefer the
informal to formal contracts. The reduction in risk, however, comes as a cost as the informal lender’s
expenditures on monitoring must be compensated in the form of lower expected returns to the borrower.
The net impact of lower risk versus higher cost will be explored in detail below.
52.2 The formal credit market
We now turn to describing the two diﬀerent types of lenders and to characterizing the feasible contract set
and the optimal contract in each case. Risk neutral, formal lenders oﬀer loans to maximize expected proﬁts,
πF. Formal lenders’ gross opportunity cost of funds is equal to rF. We make the stylized assumption
that formal lenders do not have a monitoring technology or, equivalently that monitoring is prohibitively
expensive for formal lenders, so that all formal sector contracts set c =0 .L e t RF
j be the the borrower’s
payoﬀ from a formal sector contract under state j. A formal loan contract, then, is deﬁned by the pair of
state contingent borrower payoﬀs, (RF
g,RF
b ).3 We also assume that if the loan is ﬁnanced, the lender provides
the entire capital amount, K and the farmer does not use any of her own wealth.
We assume a competitive formal loan sector so that ﬁnding the optimal contract is a principal-agent
problem in which the lender (principal) oﬀers the feasible contract that maximizes the farmer’s (agent)
expected utility. A feasible contract must satisfy three constraints. First, it must be incentive compatible.
Given the assumption of negative project returns under low eﬀort, this requires:
EU(W + RF
j ,H,0) >E U(W + RF
j ,L,0) (3)




g ) − u(W + RF
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∆ ≥ B(0) (4)
Equation 4 is the formal sector incentive compatibility constraint (FICC), which guarantees that the expected
utility gain from choosing high instead of low eﬀort is greater than the disutility cost.
3Note that deﬁning the borrower payoﬀs RF
g, and RF
b, is equivalent to the deﬁnition of an interest rate, rF and a level of
collateral, CF:
RF
g = Xg − (1 + rF)K
RF
b = Xb − CF
6The second requirement of feasibility is that the formal lender’s expected proﬁts, πF, are non-negative:
πF ≡ pH(Xg − RF
g )+( 1− pH)(Xb − RF
b ) − rFK ≥ 0 (5)
Equation 5 states this constraint which we call the formal sector participation constraint (FPC). Finally,
contracts must be ﬁnancially feasible for the borrower. Speciﬁcally, contracts must satisfy the limited liability
constraint (LLC) which states that borrowers cannot be made liable for an amount greater than their initial
wealth:
RF
j ≥− W; for j = g,b (6)
Let VF(W) be the borrower’s formal sector value function - or the expected utility from the optimal







subject to : (8)
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¤
(pH − pL) ≥ B(0) (9)
pH(Xg − RF
g )+( 1− pH)(Xb − RF
b ) − rFK ≥ 0 (10)
RF
j ≥− W; for j = g,b (11)
The solution to this problem is analyzed by Boucher et. al. (2004). The primary features of the problem and
the implications of asymmetric information are illustrated in Figure 1. The axes represent the contractual
payoﬀ to the borrower under each state. The risk averse borrower’s indiﬀerence curves are convex to the
origin and are increasing to the northeast. The risk neutral lender’s expected proﬁt contours are straight
lines and are increasing to southwest. The cross-hatched area gives the set of feasible contracts. Contracts
must lie below the curve labeled FICC - which represents the locus of contracts such that the borrower
is indiﬀerent between high versus low eﬀort. Contracts must lie to the SW of the curve labelled FPC -
7which gives the locus of contracts yielding zero formal lender proﬁts conditional on high eﬀort. Finally,
contracts must lie above the curve labelled LLC - which gives the maximum feasible collateral requirement
f o rab o r r o w e rw i t hw e a l t hW.
The constrained optimal formal contract - if it exists - is unique and is found at the intersection of the
FICC and FPC curves. The intuition behind the simultaneously binding constraints is straightforward.
Consider ﬁrst the FPC. If the lender were earning positive proﬁts, he could slightly increase the borrower’s
payoﬀ under success - thereby maintaining incentive compatibility - and make the borrower strictly better
oﬀ. Similarly, if the FICC were not binding, the lender could slightly increase the borrower’s payoﬀ under
failure while decreasing the payoﬀ under success in a way that maintains constant the lender’s proﬁt. This
would decrease the variability of the contract while holding the expected payoﬀ constant and - given the
borrower’s risk aversion - would make her strictly better oﬀ.
The eﬃciency loss from asymmetric information is also easy to see in Figure 1. If the lender could
costlessly enforce high eﬀort, the optimal contract would be at point A and would provide the borrower full
insurance. Under asymmetric information this contract is not available since the borrower’s income would
be independent of the state of nature and she would thus have no incentive to apply high eﬀort. In order
to induce the borrower to work hard, the lender must reward her under the good state of nature and punish
her under the bad state of nature. We can easily observe this conventional trade-oﬀ between the provision
of incentives and risk sharing in Figure 1. The presence of asymmetric information eﬀectively ‘removes’
the contracts between points A and B from the feasible set. These contracts force the borrower to bear
insuﬃcient risk — and therefore do not provide her suﬃcient incentive to choose high eﬀort.
Figure 1 also demonstrates the potential for non-price rationing in credit markets. If the incentive
problem is suﬃciently severe such that the FICC intersects the FPC curve at a point such that the value
of that the collateral requirement exceeds the farmer’s wealth (i.e., to the SE of point C) then the feasible
contract set would be empty and the farmer would be forced into the low return reservation activity. This
is the case of moral hazard induced quantity-rationing which is well known in the literature (Stiglitz and
Weiss 1981, Carter 1988).
Even if the feasible set is not empty, however, asymmetric information can drive the borrower to choose
8the reservation activity instead of the more lucrative farming activity. In Figure 1, this “risk rationing”
outcome would obtain if the farmer’s indiﬀerence curve through the optimal contract at point B crosses the
45-degree line at a value below w. In this situation, the certainty equivalent of the optimal contract is less
than the certain reservation wage.
2.3 The informal credit market
As in the case of the formal sector, we assume informal lenders are risk neutral and competitive. An informal
lender diﬀers from a formal one in two ways. First rI >r F, so that the informal lender’s cost of funds is
higher than the formal lender’s so that an informal loan will always be more expensive than a formal one.
Second, informal lenders have access to the monitoring technology described above. Thus in addition to the
borrower’s state contingent payoﬀs, RI
j, an informal contract also speciﬁes a level of monitoring, c.A s i n
the formal sector, an informal loan contract will always induce high eﬀort.
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RI
j ≥− W; for j = g,b (16)
Note the inclusion of the monitoring cost in the informal lender’s participation constraint, IPC and the
borrower’s informal sector incentive compatibility constraint, IICC.
How does the availability of the monitoring technology aﬀect the set of contracts the informal lender
can make available? By looking at equation 14, B0 > 0 implies that an increase in monitoring relaxes the
IICC and permits a reduction in contractual risk or, equivalently, a smoothing of consumption across states.
9However, relative to the reduction in expected consumption accompanying additional monitoring, this risk
reduction may be insuﬃcient to allow the informal sector to relax the quantity and risk rationing in the
formal sector. A necessary condition for the informal sector to be relevant is that the collateral requirement
of the optimal contract be decreasing in monitoring over some range of monitoring levels. Whether or not
an increase in monitoring decreases the collateral requirement depends on two factors. First, a large B0 -
or large reduction in the private beneﬁto fl o we ﬀort - leads to a large reduction in the utility diﬀerential
across states. A given decrease in the utility diﬀerential, in turn, will translate into a reduction in collateral
if utility in the good state is not very sensitive to a reduction in consumption. A necessary and suﬃcient
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This condition says that the collateral requirement will decrease if the marginal utility in the good state is
small enough such that if RI
g were reduced by 1/pH while RI
b remained unchanged the decrease in the utility
diﬀerential is less than B0/∆.4
Let the informal contract set (ICS) represent the set of optimal contracts conditional on a level of
monitoring. Without making additional assumptions regarding preferences and the monitoring technology,
the shape of the informal contract set can take multiple forms, two of which are depicted in Figure 2. To
develop intuitions, ﬁrst consider the left hand panel of Figure 2 which depicts the ICS for a risk neutral
borrower. Under risk neutrality, the LHS of equation 17 is constant while the RHS is decreasing in c.T h u s
initial increases in monitoring - since they give large decreases in the private beneﬁt of shirking - lead to
a decreasing collateral requirement. As diminishing returns to monitoring set in, however, and the RHS
falls below the LHS, additional expenditures in monitoring beyond cmax raise the collateral requirement.
Formally, cmax is the value of monitoring such that equation 17 holds with equality.5 This portrayal of
monitored lending with risk neutral lenders was developed by Conning (1996, 1999). Under risk neutrality,
4In other words, the unit reduction in expected consumption required such that IPC continues to bind when monitoring
expenditures are increased by $1 is achieved by only reducing consumption under success.
5While risk neutrality implies a concave ICS, it does not imply an upward sloping section. A necessary and suﬃcient








10the borrower’s indiﬀerence curves are straight lines - coinciding with the lender’s expected proﬁtc o n t o u r s-
so that the optimal contract will always be at the minimum monitoring level consistent with the borrower’s
wealth.
Note that - as drawn in Figure 2 - the ICS crosses the horizontal axis so that there would never be
quantity rationing in the informal sector. Let RIMax
b be the payoﬀ in the bad state under the optimal
contract with c = cmax.T h e n −RIMax
b , the minimum collateral requirement in the informal sector, can
be either positive or negative and the turning point of the ICS could instead be below the horizontal axis
implying a positive collateral requirement so that quantity rationing may occur even in the informal sector.
We will make the following assumption throughout:
−RIMax
b (W) <W (A5)
Assumption A5 ensures that quantity rationing will never occur in the informal sector.
The shape of the ICS under risk aversion is less straightforward. The reason is that marginal utility is
not constant so that the impact of monitoring on the collateral requirement depends both on the convexity
of B(.) and the concavity of utility. The main implication is that - in contrast to the risk neutral ICS
which is everywhere concave - the risk averse ICS may be initially convex before turning concave. To see
this, assume that for a given monitoring level, equation 17 holds. The amount by which the collateral
requirement decreases depends upon marginal utility the bad state. Since marginal utility is decreasing in
income, the collateral requirement may need to decrease at an increasing rate to maintain a binding IICC.
The right hand panel of Figure 2 shows this case.
Ignoring the liability constraint, the optimal informal contract under risk aversion will be the point on
the ICS that yields highest expected borrower utility. Since borrower indiﬀerence curves are convex, the
optimal contract can either be an interior solution - depicted by the contract at point A in Figure 2 - or a
corner solution at zero monitoring. If the liability constraint is violated at A - i.e. W<−RI∗
b -t h e nt h e
optimal contract would occur at the point on the ICS with rb = −W. In this case, the borrower’s lack of
collateral wealth obliges her to accept a contract with “too much” insurance.
112.4 Two potential roles of informal sector
Given this stylized portrayal of the two loan sectors, we now take up the question of sectoral choice. Specif-
ically, we want to think about why individuals would end up with an informal loan. As stated in the
introduction, there are three main answers to this question. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h ei n f o r m a ls e c t o ri st h e
lowest cost source of funds. This may be, as found by Kochar (1997) in India, because family and friends
are willing to oﬀer loans with very low or zero nominal interest rates. Alternatively, in spite of higher
nominal interest rates, the relatively low transaction costs of informal loans make their eﬀective cost lower.
In our context, however, we observe the more conventional result that informal loans are quite a bit more
expensive - even accounting for transaction costs. Thus we explore two alternative explanations: namely
that the informal sector may relax both quantity and risk rationing in the formal sector.
We portray these two possibilities in Figures 3 and 4. First consider Figure 3 which shows the case of
a farmer who resorts to the informal sector because she is shut out of the formal sector. As depicted, the
farmer’s feasible contract set in the formal sector is empty. The minimum collateral, incentive compatible
formal contract is at point A, which requires collateral greater than the farmer’s wealth, W.T h i s f a r m e r i s
quantity rationed in the formal sector. The optimal informal contract is at point B.R e c a l l t h a t t h e I C S
represents the set of optimal contracts conditional on the monitoring level. Given the tangency between the
farmer’s indiﬀerence curve and the ICS, point B, is the best of these conditionally optimal contracts and is
feasible since it requires collateral less than W. As drawn, the farmer would prefer this informal contract
to the reservation activity since the indiﬀerence curve through B intersects the 45-degree line to the NE of
the ﬁxed wage, w. Equivalently, the certainty equivalent of the optimal informal contract is greater than
the reservation wage. This corresponds to the informal sector as recipient of “spillover” demand from the
formal sector. The farmer would prefer to borrow from the formal sector (indiﬀerence curve through A is
above the curve through B) but is denied the formal loan and must “settle” for the informal loan.
Figure 4 depicts the case of a farmer who instead chooses to borrow from the informal sector even though
a formal contract is available. In this case, even though the optimal informal contract at B yields lower
expected income, it implies suﬃciently lower risk (oﬀers suﬃcient insurance) such that it is strictly preferred
to both the formal contract and the reservation activity. Note that without the informal sector, this farmer
12would be risk-rationed in the formal sector since the certainty equivalent of the optimal formal contract at
A is less than w.
3 Wealth, optimal contract and activity choice
N o wt h a tw eh a v ed e p i c t e dt h et w op o t e n t i a lr o l e so ft he informal sector - we turn to the question of for
whom does the informal sector play these roles? Speciﬁcally, we want to see:
1. Who is excluded from the formal sector and informal sectors?
2. Of those excluded, who chooses an informal loan instead of the reservation activity?
3. Of those who have access to both a formal and informal contract, who chooses the informal contract?
In all of the ensuing analysis, by “who” we explicitly mean farmer wealth.
3.1 Wealth biased quantity rationing
Here we answer question 1. It is intuitive that if anyone is quantity rationed in the formal sector, it will be
the relatively poor who have insuﬃcient wealth to post as collateral. That quantity rationing in the absence
of monitoring is wealth-biased has been established by Boucher et. al. (2004). We brieﬂy discuss the logic
here because the result is not as obvious as it may ﬁrst appear because the endogeneity of contract terms to
farmer wealth implies oﬀsetting wealth eﬀects in the availability of a contract. One one hand, an additional
dollar of wealth relaxes the liability constraint and allows a wealthier farmer to post greater collateral. On
the other hand, the collateral requirement is increasing in wealth because as wealth increases, a risk averse
farmer becomes less sensitive to a given spread in consumption across states. Thus the lender will raise the
collateral requirement to maintain incentives for the farmer to choose high eﬀort. Boucher et. al. show that
the relaxation of the liability constraint dominates the tightening of the incentive compatibility constraint
so if anyone is quantity rationed, it will be the relatively poor.
Let W∗
F denote the wealth level such that all three constraints simultaneously bind and a single formal
contract is available. It is easy show that, if it exists, W∗
F is unique so that any farmer with wealth greater
than W∗
F will have a formal contract available while those with wealth less than W∗
F will be quantity rationed.

















Under assumption A5, farmers that are quantity rationed in the formal sector will always have access
to an informal loan. So we have seen that any farmer with W>W ∗ will have access to contracts in both
sectors. In the next section, we see how - for wealth levels above W∗ - wealth endowments map into activity
choice.
3.2 Wealth and Risk Rationing
Understanding activity choice requires a comparison across three activities. We proceed as follows. First,
we compare the best available contract in each sector to the reservation activity. When both contracts are
preferred to the reservation activity, we need to compare farmer welfare in each sector.
3.2.1 Reservation activity versus formal loan
In this section we ignore quantity rationing (i.e., assume we’re dealing with W>W ∗)a n df o c u so nt h er o l e
of wealth in the comparison between ﬁnancing production with a formal contract versus the wage activity.
Stated another way - we examine the wealth eﬀect in a principal-agent model. Several papers have shown the
rather counter-intuitive result that higher wealth farmers (agents) are more likely to choose the reservation
activity. We review this argument in the current model.
Figure 5 shows the multiple and oﬀsetting eﬀects of wealth on the farmer’s activity comparison. First,
assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, the borrower becomes less risk averse. Therefore, holding contract
terms ﬁxed, the certainty equivalent of a given contract increases in wealth. We call this eﬀect the risk
aversion eﬀect which implies that if a borrower is indiﬀerent between the formal contract and reservation
activity, an increase in wealth - holding contract terms constant - leads her to strictly prefer the formal
contract. In Figure 5 the farmer’s indiﬀerence curve through the optimal contract at A ﬂatten out as wealth
14increases so that it crosses the 45-degree line at D, to the NE of the reservation wage.
The contract terms, however, do not remain constant as wealth increases. This is the result of the
incentive eﬀect rooted in the concavity of the utility function, which implies that a wealthier borrower is less
sensitive to a given diﬀerence in contractual payoﬀs across states. Consequently, he cares less about being
in the bad rather than the good state and, thus, has less incentive to increase the probability of success
by choosing high eﬀort. To counter this negative incentive eﬀect, the lender has to increase the diﬀerence
b e t w e e ns u c c e s sa n df a i l u r ep a y o ﬀs. As a consequence the incentive eﬀect negatively impacts the risk averse
borrower. In ﬁgure 5, the worsening of contract terms is given by the SE shift of the optimal contract from
A to B.
What is the net result of these opposing eﬀects? In Figure 5, the risk aversion eﬀect dominates so that
it is the relatively poor who are risk rationed while the wealthy accept the contract and undertake risky
farming. We could, however, draw the picture to show the opposite result. Ultimately, the relative size of
these eﬀects depends on the assumptions made about preferences There are two relevant papers that derive
suﬃcient conditions to answer this question. Newman (1995) - in an application to insurance markets and
activity choice - shows that a suﬃcient condition for the incentive eﬀect to dominate is that 1
u0 is convex.
Thiele and Wambach (1999) re-examine this issue in a more general optimal labor contract context with
the principal having full market power (i.e. similar to Grossman and Hart (1983)) and derive a slightly less
restrictive suﬃcient condition. Let P and A denote respectively the coeﬃcient of absolute prudence and
risk aversion. Consider the following 2 conditions:
Condition 1: P<3A (18)
Condition 2: P>3A (19)
Condition 1 is Thiele and Wambach’s suﬃcient condition for the dominance of the incentive eﬀect. In our
context, Condition 1 is suﬃcient for the counter-intuitive result that wealthier households are more likely to
be risk rationed. Condition 2 is suﬃcient for the more intuitive wealth-biased risk rationing to occur.
Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
15Proposition 1 Wealth biased formal risk rationing. Let c WF denote the wealth level of the agent who
is indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing the risky investment with her optimal formal contract versus the certain
reservation activity and let CEF(W) denote the certainty equivalent associated with the optimal contract for













c WF + w
´
(20)
Then P>(<)3A → ∂CE
∂W > (<)0 so that any agent with wealth greater than (less than) c WF will strictly
prefer the risky investment with their optimal formal contract while agents with wealth less than (greater
than) c WF prefer the reservation activity.6
The ﬁrst equality in equation 20 implicitly deﬁnes the certainty equivalent associated with the marginal
farmer’s optimal formal contract. The second equality follows from the deﬁnition of the marginal wealth
level - and implies that the indiﬀerent farmer’s certainty equivalent is just equal to the ﬁxed wage.
In general, which comparative static result do we expect to hold? Without additional assumptions about
u(;) then the relationship between P and A depends on the value of consumption at which these functions
are evaluated. Thus, while DARA implies that P>A , whether or not condition 1 or condition 2 holds at
c WF + w is not clear and depends on the other parameters of the model. If, however, we restrict attention
to the class of constant relative risk averse preferences, then knowing the degree of relative risk aversion
is suﬃcient to know which of the two conditions holds. Speciﬁcally, if r is the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion, then r<1/2 is equivalent to P>3A.7 Restricting attention to constant relative risk aversion,
thus has strong implications for the direction we would expect to observe for risk rationing. Empirical
studies such as those cited in Gollier (2001), for example, suggest that plausible values for r lie between 1
and 4. This would imply that condition 1 holds so that the wealthier households are risk rationed.
6proofs for all propositions are available by request.






163.2.2 Reservation activity versus informal loan
What about risk rationing in the informal sector? In the informal sector, the agent has the possibility of
choosing the level of monitoring, and we argued that - to some extent - this enables the agent to trade risk
against expected income. As wealth increases we argued that the “incentive eﬀect” requires the diﬀerence in
payoﬀs between the good and the bad state to increase in order for contracts to remain incentive compatible.
T h ec h o i c eo v e rc enables the agent to potentially mitigate this increase in risk by choosing a higher level
of monitoring. However this additional ﬂexibility does not change the direction of the risk rationing result
established for the formal sector. In fact, under the same assumptions about the utility function the same
results hold. We restate these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Wealth biased informal risk rationing. Restrict attention to CRRA utility functions. Let
CEI(W,c) denote the certainty equivalent associated with the optimal contract at the level of monitoring c
for an agent with wealth W in the informal sector. Deﬁne c∗(W) as the optimal level of monitoring in the
informal sector for an agent with wealth W.L e t c WI denote the wealth level of the agent who is indiﬀerent
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(21)
Then P>(<)3A → ∂CE
∂W > (<)0 so that any agent with wealth greater than (less than) c WI will strictly
prefer the risky investment with their optimal informal contract while agents with wealth less than (greater
than) c WI prefer the reservation activity.
The logic behind the proof is straightforward. Consider condition 2, i.e. P>3A.B y d e ﬁnition,
the optimal contract is the one with the highest certainty equivalent. Let c∗(c W) denote the optimal
monitoring level in this contract. Now consider an increase in wealth from c W to W0. Under CRRA, we
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, the wealthier farmer will strictly prefer farming with the informal contract to the
17reservation activity.8
Even though monitoring does not reverse the direction of the wealth bias, the monitored informal sector
may still alleviate the risk rationing problems of the formal sector. Consider CRRA utility functions and
assume that condition 2 holds. We established that in this case, if W<c WF then the agent prefers the ﬁxed
wage activity to a formal loan while if W>c WI then the agent prefers an informal contract to the ﬁxed wage
activity. This suggests that if c WI <W<c WF then this relatively poor agent would retreat to the ﬁxed wage
if she had access only to a formal loan while in the presence of the informal sector she chooses to undertake
the project with an informal loan. If instead condition 2 holds, the informal sector may similarly alleviate
risk rationing of rich agents. We will discuss the conditions necessary for the informal sector to play this
role below. Until now we have focused on the agent’s comparison between a loan in each sector and the
reservation activity. The ﬁnal piece of the analysis - which will permit us to map sectoral and activity choice
in wealth space - is to compare the relative attractiveness of the optimal formal versus informal contracts.
3.3 Comparison across sectors
We now ask who is more likely to prefer an informal loan over a formal one conditional on positive access
in both sector. Since an informal loan is both less risky and more expensive than a formal loan, it is closer
to the ﬁx wage activity in term of risk and expected return. Therefore our intuition suggests that, under
condition 2 (that led to risk rationing of the poor), a poor agent is more likely to prefer an informal loan,
while under condition 1 the opposite holds (the rich are more likely to prefer the informal loan). Indeed this
intuition holds and is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Sectoral choice. Restrict attention to CRRA utility functions. Let c WI/F denote the wealth
level of the agent who is indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing the risky investment with her optimal informal contract
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8If we relax constant relative risk aversion, then we are not sure what happens. The reason is as follows. While we know
that either condition 1 or 2 will hold at the optimal monitoring level, the same condition need not hold at other monitoring
levels. Thus the certainty equivalent at diﬀerent monitoring levels may move in opposite directions as wealth increases. In
future research, will explore this more.
18Then if P>(<)3A any agent with wealth greater than (less than) c WI/F will strictly prefer the formal
contract while agents with wealth less than (greater than) c WI/F prefer the informal contract
This last proposition enables now a complete mapping of activity preferences over the wealth spectrum.
In the following discussion we assume that the three indiﬀerent wealth level (c WF, c WI and c WI/F) lie within
the wealth support [W,W].
Assume condition 1 holds. Propositions 1 and 2 establish that the value functions VF and VI cross Vw
(the utility of the agent in the reservation activity) from above at c WF and c WI respectively. Proposition
3 establishes that VF crosses VI from above at c WI/F. Furthermore since VF, VI and Vw are all strictly
increasing in wealth, and the direction of the crossing is unambiguous at each crossing point, the crossing
points are unique. The relative position of c WI and c WI/F is crucial for the prediction of activity choice.
If c WI/F > c WI, the informal sector would never be chosen. If c WI/F < c WI a g e n t sw i t hw e a l t hi nt h e
intermediate range c WI/F <W<c WI will choose the entrepreneurial activity ﬁnanced by an informal loan.
Figure 6 illustrates this case. Similarly under condition 2, the informal sector is chosen by some agents only
if c WI/F > c WI. Figure 7 illustrates this case. Let us brieﬂy discuss what the relative position of c WI/F and
c WI depends upon. In addition to preferences, the level of the ﬁxed wage and the relative attractiveness of
the contracts in each sector determine the relative position of c WI/F and c WI. The informal sector is relatively
more attractive as its reservation cost of funds decreases and the eﬃciency of monitoring increases.
In this model the presence of the informal sector relaxes risk rationing in the formal sector for some agents.
As depicted in Figures 6 and 7, for whom the informal sector relaxes risk rationing depends on preferences.
Figure 6 portrays the empirically more plausible case where condition 1 holds. In this case, in the absence
of the informal sector, agents with wealth between c WF and c WI would be risk rationed. The availabiliy of
less risky informal contracts induces this additional group of agents to undertake risky production. In this
case - relative to the formal sector - the informal sector induces wealthier agents to undertake production.
Figure 7 portrays the more intuitive results that hold under the empirically less plausible condition 2. In
this case, the informal sector relaxes risk rationing for relatively poorer agents.
We have now studied the impact of wealth successively on access to a loan, on preference for a risky
activity over a certain activity and on preference for a formal versus a informal loan. We will now summarize
19the predictions of our model in terms of the partitioning of wealth space into the diﬀerent activities when
both supply (quantity rationing) and demand (risk rationing) are accounted for.
3.4 Bringing supply and demand together: mapping of activities in wealth
space
We present here a brief summary of the predictions of the model as well as numerical simulations. Recall
that some agents may lack access to a formal loan because they cannot post suﬃcient collateral. These
agents are quantity rationed in the formal sector. We argued that if some agents are excluded from the
formal sector they are at the low end of the wealth spectrum and gave conditions under which this occurs.
To make the supply issue relevant we assume now that theses conditions hold, so that W∗
F ∈ [W,W] and
agents with wealth W smaller than W∗
F do not have access to a formal loan.
Assume again that c WF, c WI and c WI/F are in the wealth spectrum [W,W]. The impact of quantity ra-
tioning depends upon the position of W∗
F relatively to the various indiﬀerence points. A complete description
of all possibilities would be cumbersome so that we simulate and discuss only two cases.
Figure 8 presents results of a numerical simulation for preferences such that condition 2 holds and
W∗
F < c WF < c WI/F. The parameters used in the simulation are given in Table 1. The ﬁgure plots diﬀerences
between the three value functions (Vw − VF, Vw − VI,a n dVI − VF) against wealth and activity choices are
reported under the graph. First note that W∗
F < c WF implies that nobody who is denied a formal loan would
want one, thus the informal sector is not the recipient of the spill-over demand. It does however alleviate
risk rationing in the formal sector for agent with wealth between c WI and c WF who, in the absence of the
informal sector, would not undertake the project.
Figure 9 shows what happens when condition 1 instead holds. For the parameter value chosen (Table 1),
the following relationship holds: W∗
F < c WI/F < c WI. In this case, the informal sector plays both roles. Since
condition 1 holds, agents with wealth less than c WF would prefer a formal loan to the reservation activity,
thus the poorest are quantity rationed in the formal sector and recur to the informal sector to ﬁnance their
project. Furthermore, since condition 1 holds, the informal sector relaxes risk rationing for the relatively
wealthy, i.e. those with wealth between c WF and c WI.
204 Conclusions and a Sketch of a Model Extension
In this paper, we have developed a model which suggests a re-evaluation of the role of the informal loan
sector. The informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers.
Monitoring, by limiting the private beneﬁt the borrower perceives by shirking (i.e., choosing low eﬀort)
reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral. This enables informal lenders
to serve two types of clients: 1) Those who cannot post the collateral required by the formal sector; and 2)
Those who are able but do not want to post collateral. The model is thus consistent with the conventional
view of the informal sector as recipient of spillover demand (quantity rationed) from the formal sector. It also
demonstrates an additional role of the informal sector - namely as provider of insurance as the lower collateral
requirement implies greater consumption smoothing across states of nature. This potential insurance role
may especially help in understanding the prevalence of informal loans in rural areas of developing countries
where risk is high and insurance markets are virtually non-existent. It also suggests that policies such as
land titling programs which seek to activate credit market participation by augmenting the poor’s ability to
post collateral may fall short of their objective.
Under empirically plausible preferences (constant relative risk aversion greater than 1/2), the model
generates a counter-intuitive result: namely that the beneﬁciaries of the insurance provided by the informal
sector are the relatively wealthy. In a related paper applied to occupational choice, Newman (1995) concludes
that this type of model would lead to the conclusion that the poor would become entrepreneurs and hire-in
the rich as wage laborers. If we are to trust our intuitions, we must conclude that the current model
somehow fails to capture important components of reality. One possibility, as explored by Thiele and
Wambach (1999), is to relax the assumption of additive separability between consumption and eﬀort. For
example, if the disutility of eﬀort were decreasing in consumption (a nutrition based argument could be
used, for example, to suggest that exerting additional eﬀort is more costly for the extreme poor) then the
incentive problem would become less severe as agent wealth increased making it more likely that wealthy
agents accept their optimal contract and undertake the high return productive activity.
An alternative approach is to acknowledge the heterogeneity of types of wealth. Our model has implicitly
held project size - or productive wealth - constant while allowing only heterogeneity in liquidity. In developing
21countries, land endowments vary widely within regions. In terms of our model, why would the diﬀerence
between ﬁnancial wealth (W) and land wealth matter? Consider the thought experiment we have conducted
throughout the paper. We have held farm size constant and increased ﬁnancial wealth so that ﬁnancially
wealthier agents become less sensitive to the outcome of their farm. To make the agent care about the
outcome, lenders respond by shifting disproportionately large downside risk to the agent. In contrast, as
her land wealth increases the agent naturally has greater incentive to work hard and increase the probability
of the good state of nature because, for a given contract, the spread in consumption across states increases.
In addition, the expected consumption foregone by choosing the reservation activity increases in farm size.
These impacts both work towards the more intuitive result that wealthier agents are more likely to undertake
the risky productive activity.
Figure 10 shows what happens when we introduce heterogeneity in farm size by mapping activity choice
in two-dimensional wealth space. The parameters of the simulation are given in Table 1. As before,
the activity choices are to ﬁnance production on the entire farm with either a formal or informal loan or
rent out the entire farm. A CRRA utility function was chosen with a plausible coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion equal to 1.2. While the counter-intuitive direction of risk rationing holds in a vertical (increasing
W) direction, it is reversed in the horizontal direction. so that land poor households are more likely to be
risk rationed while the land rich undertake production. While future work will need to relax some of the
restricitive modeling assumptions, this analysis suggests that heterogeneity of asset types controlled by an
individual - as well as heterogeneity of total wealth across individuals - is important in understanding credit
market participation and the way which individuals utilize their productive assets.
22Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1: functional forms and parameter for the simulations 
 
Simulation 1, 2 & 3 
 
Utility of consumption (CRRA with 
r: coef. Of relative risk aversion) 
u(x)=(1/(1-r))x^{(1-r)} 





parameters  Simulation 1  Simulation 2  Simulation 3 
coef of RRA r  0.4  1.2  1.2 
Parameter of B: a  10  2/3  2 
Parameter of B: b  1/15  1/5  2 
Gross return from project  70  70  70 
Capital requirement, K  55  55  55 
Fixed wage, w  7.87  0.5  3 (rental rate) 
Proba state G with effort H  0.8  0.8  0.8 
Diff in  proba good state, ∆ 0.7  0.7  0.7 
 
Simulation 1, 2 & 3 
 
Sector Formal  Informal 
Opportunity cost of fund  1.073  1.09 
Net return from the project  11  10 
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Figure 6: Activity preferences under P<3A and c WI/F < c WI
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26Figure 7: Activity preferences under P>3A and c W/ < c WI/F
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Figure 8: Activity choice and credit market outcomes under P>3A: Simulation 1
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